126: Chapter 123 The Negotiation Table

April 28, Amman.

A conference room in the Jordanian Royal Palace had been converted into a negotiation venue.

The Iranian delegation was led by Rafsanjani, with Bani-Sadr attending in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief, along with two Foreign Ministry officials and a military advisor—that military advisor, named Darvish, had been appointed by Reza, with the task of vetting any military clauses to prevent the delegation from making compromises that exceeded their bottom line.

The Iraqi delegation was led by Khairallah, accompanied by the Foreign Minister and a representative from the Intelligence Agency.

Both sides sat on opposite sides of a long table, with King Hussein sitting at the head, acting as the mediator.

The negotiations hit a wall within ten minutes of starting.

Khairallah laid out Iraq's terms: an immediate ceasefire, both armies to withdraw to pre-war borders, the release of all prisoners of war, and separate consultations on the issue of reparations.

Rafsanjani read out Iran's three bottom lines verbatim.

Khairallah's expression changed when he heard the third point, and he interrupted Rafsanjani: "Basra is Iraqi territory; there is no room for negotiation on this point."

"Basra is currently under Iranian control," Rafsanjani said calmly, "that is also a fact."

"You occupied it illegally through war—"

"We occupied it after repelling Iraq's invasion," Rafsanjani said. "King Hussein knows better than anyone who started the war."

King Hussein gave a light cough, signaling both sides to cool down.

Bani-Sadr had not spoken from the beginning until now. He sat next to Rafsanjani with an untouched cup of tea in front of him, his eyes drifting—he was thinking about something else.

He was thinking: If these negotiations succeeded, Reza would win completely. He had won on the battlefield and would win at the negotiating table, and all of Iran would worship him like a god. And he, Bani-Sadr, a "Commander-in-Chief" who had signed his name but never fought a battle, would become completely invisible.

He lowered his head, wrote a few words on the paper in front of him, and pushed it to the Foreign Ministry official beside him.

The official looked at the words, frowned, and said nothing. The paper read: "The third point can be withdrawn."

During the meeting break, in the corridor.

Darvish found Rafsanjani and shoved the paper into his hand.

After reading it, Rafsanjani's expression darkened.

"Who wrote this?"

"President Bani-Sadr."

Rafsanjani folded the paper, put it in his pocket, and then turned to find Bani-Sadr.

"What do you mean by writing this?"

"The third point is a deadlock. It can't be negotiated, so withdrawing it would better facilitate the negotiations."

"The third point is the bottom line determined by the frontline commanders," Rafsanjani said, "and the Ayatollah approved it. If you want to withdraw it, you need the Ayatollah's nod."

"I am the Commander-in-Chief—"

"You are the nominal Commander-in-Chief," Rafsanjani's tone was light, but every word was like a nail. "Basra was taken by Reza; when it comes to the terms for Basra, he has the final say."

Bani-Sadr's face flushed red, but he did not speak again.

April 29, the second day of negotiations.

King Hussein made a compromise proposal—the Basra issue would be temporarily shelved, and a framework agreement would first be reached on the ceasefire line, the repatriation of prisoners of war, and reparations, with the final ownership of Basra left for subsequent negotiations.

The Iranian side agreed to this framework.

The Iraqi side also agreed, but added a condition: the compensation amount should not exceed three billion dollars.

Rafsanjani said: "Ten billion."

Khairallah said: "Three billion is the limit."

Both sides remained deadlocked on this figure for a long time.

The final result was five billion dollars, to be paid off over five years in oil commodities.

The ceasefire line was drawn according to the existing control line, which meant that Iran would continue to control the Fao Peninsula and Basra. Prisoners of war would be repatriated in batches, to be completed within three months.

The issue of Basra was written into an annex of the agreement, noted as a "matter for continued negotiation"—within the next two years, both sides would negotiate the final ownership of Basra; if they could not reach an agreement within two years, the United Nations would host a referendum.

The agreement was initialed before noon on April 30.

April 30, Ahvaz.

Darvish faxed the agreement text back, and after reading it, Reza placed the text on the table.

"Five billion," he said, "it's five billion short."

"But Basra was kept," Karimi said, "if it can't be negotiated within two years, there will be a referendum. Most of the residents of Basra are Shia, so the referendum result—"

"The referendum result won't necessarily be in our favor," Reza said. "The residents being Shia does not mean they are willing to be incorporated into Iran. The people of Basra consider themselves Iraqis; they just happen to be Shia."

"Then what should we do?"

"Within two years, govern Basra well. Water supply, electricity, education, medical care—do it ten times better than in the era of Saddam Hussein. Make them feel that following Iran is better than following Saddam Hussein. Solve political problems with economics."

He took out that deep blue notebook, turned to a new page, and wrote a line:

"The ceasefire is in effect. But the issue of Basra is not over; it has just changed to a different battlefield."

He closed the notebook and heard gunfire from outside the window—it was the sound of celebratory aerial fire; the frontline soldiers were using bullets to celebrate the ceasefire.

He did not go to the window to look.

May 3, 1981, Tehran.

Three days after the ceasefire agreement was signed, Tehran welcomed Reza.

He arrived on a military transport plane, without prior notice, without a welcome ceremony, and drove directly from the airport to Rafsanjani's residence.

The streets of Tehran were filled with banners celebrating the ceasefire, but the slogans on those banners were of a uniform standard—Ayatollah Khomeini's name was at the very top, "Long live the Islamic Revolution" was in the middle, and there was no mention of Reza's name.

This had been specially arranged by someone.

Reza noticed, but said nothing.

The first thing Rafsanjani said when he saw him was: "The timing of your return is not very good."

"What is it?"

"Bani-Sadr."

Rafsanjani recounted what had happened in the last week.

After the ceasefire agreement was initialed, Bani-Sadr returned directly to Tehran from Amman, without passing through Ahvaz or notifying Reza. Upon his return, he did something he had not dared to do before—he accepted an interview with a reporter from Le Monde and criticized Reza by name.

In the interview, Bani-Sadr said these words: "The achievements Iran has made in the war are the credit of all the soldiers and the result of the leadership of the Ayatollah. But now, some people are trying to turn a collective victory into personal political capital; this is a betrayal of the Islamic Revolution."

He did not say Reza's name, but all of Iran knew who he was talking about.

"He thinks that because the negotiations are over and the war is over, I have become his target," Reza said.

"Yes. He feels your maximum value has been squeezed dry, and now it is time for him to settle scores with you."

"What is the Ayatollah's attitude?"

"The Ayatollah read that interview and did not make a public statement, but he had Montazeri pass a message to Bani-Sadr: be cautious with media interviews. This is a warning, but it is not strong enough."

"What about Montazeri?"

"He has the evidence you gave him," Rafsanjani said, "but he hasn't formally presented it to the Ayatollah. He is waiting for the right moment."

"The moment has arrived," Reza said, "now is the moment."