75: Chapter 72 The Play

December 10, 1979, Ahvaz.

The Khuzestan Oil Consultation Committee issued its first official public statement.

The content of the statement had only one core message: In the current climate where Iran's sovereignty is threatened by the United States, the output of all oil fields in Khuzestan will be directly managed and dispatched by the Provincial Consultation Committee. Any attempt to forcibly levy or alter the flow of output will be regarded as an infringement on Iran's sovereignty, and Khuzestan reserves the right to take any necessary measures for self-defense.

Once this statement was released, it immediately caused an uproar within Iran.

The interim government's reaction was to attempt suppression, but they could not—because the statement was issued by the Workers' Representative Congress in the name of the collective, not as a personal statement from Reza, so the interim government had no way to directly accuse a prince of engaging in separatism. At the same time, the content of the statement itself was beyond reproach—it was speaking entirely for the national interests of Iran, with no content of a separatist nature.

The reaction of international public opinion was even more interesting—the revolutionary factions within Iran saw this as a strong stance against the United States and expressed support; Western media, meanwhile, began to pay attention to this "emerging strong local leader" in Iran, with some American media even beginning to refer to Reza as the "Independent Warlord of Southern Iran."

But the reaction Reza cared about most came from Ayatollah Khomeini.

One week later, Ayatollah Khomeini issued a brief statement through official channels: "The goal of the revolution is to protect the interests of Iran, not to establish some form of autocratic central power. The position of Khuzestan represents the true spirit of the Iranian nation."

This sentence was equivalent to giving official recognition to Reza's Khuzestan autonomy at the highest national level, while also shifting the focus of public opinion from "separatism" to "national unity."

When Hassan Rajab saw this statement, he finally asked the question that had been weighing on his heart:

"What exactly is the relationship between you and Ayatollah Khomeini now?"

Reza Pahlavi thought for a moment and gave a very precise answer:

"We are allies who use each other, but both sides tacitly acknowledge this, so no one wants to break this situation—he needs me to maintain the stability of Khuzestan and the continuous output of oil, and I need his authority to ensure that Khuzestan will not be directly annexed by the central government. This relationship will be maintained until the day our interests truly conflict; until then, we will both take our agreement seriously."

"When will that day come?"

"If the Iran-Iraq War truly breaks out, it will be after the war ends," Reza Pahlavi said. "By then, Iran's power structure will enter a phase of reorganization, and everything will be reshuffled!"

...

November 4, 1979, Tehran.

In front of the United States Embassy in Iran, a group of Iranian students broke through the iron gates.

This was not the first time someone had attempted to storm the embassy, but this time was different—it was organized, planned, had a clear goal, and those who rushed in had no intention of negotiating.

They occupied the embassy.

When the news reached Reza Pahlavi, he was in the study of the Governors Mansion in Ahvaz, talking on the phone with Karimi. Karimi's voice was hurried, but it was the kind of hurriedness that comes from training—it was controlled:

"The hostage crisis has begun. About fifty Americans are being held at the embassy. The interim government is negotiating, but it doesn't look like they have any intention of calming this down immediately—in fact, there are signs that this might have happened with the tacit approval of certain power groups."

"What is Ayatollah Khomeini's attitude?" Reza Pahlavi asked.

"He hasn't made an official statement yet, but the private information is that he sees this as an opportunity to 'test the resolve of the United States.'"

Reza Pahlavi paused for two seconds and said: "Tell Mohammadi and Farrokhzad that the army is to enter the highest state of combat readiness, but do not engage in any actual operations; just be prepared. Also, notify all detachments across the country that starting today, every unit's ammunition reserves must be doubled, and fuel reserves must be doubled, but this order is not to be made public."

"You mean—" Karimi's voice paused.

"I mean that what comes next will be very complicated," Reza Pahlavi said. "The United States is considering how to respond, and Iran's various power groups are considering how to exploit this, and I need to ensure that when everyone is on the move, our fist is the hardest."

Hanging up the phone, Reza Pahlavi picked up the dark blue notebook and flipped to a page marked "November 1979." There were only two lines of text on that page, which he had written three years ago:

"The embassy incident will intensify the contradictions between the US and Iran to an irreconcilable degree. This is a window, but also a trap. The window lies in the ability to secure much-needed resources and international legitimacy; the trap lies in the fact that once seen as a true threat by the United States, the consequences will be very serious."

Below it was one sentence: "The key is timing."