78: Chapter 75 Iron and Blood in the Desert

In February 1980, intelligence from the Iraq side began to look suspicious.

News from Karimi in Baghdad showed that the Iraq army had conducted multiple large-scale deployments over the past six months, each pointing toward the Iran border. Although Baghdad officials never admitted these deployments were aimed at Iran, Reza knew—or rather, he knew better than anyone—what these deployments meant.

"Saddam is waiting for the right moment," Reza said to Hassan. "He is waiting for the conflict between Iran and the United States to deepen enough that Iran has no time to look after its borders. His advisors must be telling him: Iran is currently beset by internal and external troubles, and as long as a quick war is fought at the border, he can reclaim the Shatt al-Arab and redraw the spheres of influence in the Persian Gulf."

"When do you think he will make his move?" Hassan asked.

"The border demarcation stipulated by the 1975 Algiers Agreement expires in 1982," Reza said, "but Saddam won't wait that long. He will wait until Iran is at its weakest—perhaps next spring, perhaps in the autumn. But no matter when it is, he will definitely make his move."

"Then what should we do?"

"Let him think we are weak," Reza said. "Let him think the Iran army is still in that state of low morale and aging equipment from 1979. And then, the moment he makes his move, let him see what a true Persia iron fist is."

In mid-February, unexpected news disrupted part of Reza's plan.

The message Ayatollah Khomeini sent through Bakhtiar was: The Iran government has decided to resolve the hostage crisis in the near future and release all American hostages in exchange for the United States lifting economic sanctions.

This news was a huge variable for Reza.

If the hostage crisis ended this way, the relationship between Iran and the United States might see some degree of easing—not a return to normal, but at least it would stop deteriorating. This meant the logical foundation of the "anti-US military-industrial system" Reza had built through the hostage crisis might be shaken.

But he quickly understood the implications of it.

Ayatollah Khomeini chose to resolve the hostage crisis at this point not because he had suddenly softened toward the United States, but because he needed to resolve internal concerns before the war broke out—regardless of whether this war was fought against the United States or Iraq. If the hostage crisis continued, Iran's diplomatic environment would become increasingly adverse, making it more passive when facing potential military threats.

So this decision was not a "surrender," but a "retreat to advance."

Reza reacted quickly. He conveyed a message to the Ayatollah Khomeini's advisory group through Rafsanjani: Releasing the hostages is possible, but Iran must get enough benefits from the United States—not symbolic concessions, but substantive things that can be immediately converted into military capabilities.

Specifically, he demanded that the United States lift the embargo on Iran's military equipment and allow Iran to obtain necessary parts and technology to "ensure regional military balance."

The essence of this demand was to use the last opportunity of the hostage crisis to extract the last valuable things from the United States' pocket—although it was unlikely the Americans would actually lift the embargo, the negotiation itself was a bargaining chip.

In early March 1980, Rafsanjani brought feedback from the Ayatollah Khomeini's side.

"The Ayatollah agrees to your suggestion in principle," Rafsanjani said, "but there is one problem—the Americans won't give in so easily; they might set up various obstacles in the negotiations."

"Negotiations are obstacles in themselves," Reza said. "The point is not the obstacles themselves, but what we can get after we overcome them."

He paused, then asked a key question:

"Any new developments regarding the recent military movements from Iraq?"

"Yes," Rafsanjani said. "Baghdad has just completed a round of large-scale conscription. Conservatively estimated, they have recruited at least 80,000 new soldiers in the past two months. These new recruits are currently training at military bases in southern Iraq, and the content of their training—according to the intelligence we received—is amphibious offensive operations targeting the Iran border region."

When Reza heard this information, there was no expression on his face.

80,000 new recruits. Amphibious offensive operations.

Saddam really was preparing.

"Good," Reza said. "Since he is ready, we should be ready too."

He immediately sent a message to Fatima: "Persia-1 Type A deployment accelerated, complete the deployment of all thirty units within forty days. At the same time, speed up the sample testing of Persia-2 Missile; I want to see the range data within half a month."

Fatima's reply had only one word as usual: "Understood."

On March 15, 1980, Reza held a secret meeting in Ahvaz with only his core staff. Attendees included Hassan, Karimi, Najjari, Farrokhzad, and Fatima, who participated via video link.

The content of the meeting was only one thing: Full-scale war preparations for Khuzestan Province.

Reza drew a simple map on the whiteboard, marking three main directions from which Iraq might attack: the northern mountain passes, the central Shatt al-Arab coastline, and the southern Khorramabad-Abadan line.

"Iraq's main offensive force will be tank units," Reza said. "Their T-62 and T-72 Tank clusters will advance along the Shatt al-Arab, attempting to break through our border defense lines in the shortest possible time and capture the Abadan oil fields."

"If they succeed in capturing Abadan," he continued, "we will lose one of Iran's largest oil refining facilities, and the direction of the entire war will be in their favor."

So his plan was:

First, deploy a dense anti-tank firepower network along the Shatt al-Arab, forming the first line of defense with simplified Anti-tank mines and rocket launchers. The cost of these mines is extremely low—less than ten dollars each—but to Iraq's T-72 Tank, every one of them is a fatal threat.

Second, deploy Persian-1 Type B missile launch sites around the Abadan oil fields; once the enemy enters range, use missiles for saturation strikes. This tactic is not "defense" in the traditional sense, but an "offensive defense"—crippling the enemy before they reach the oil fields.

Third, deploy the rapid response force along the Ahvaz-Abadan highway as a reserve force, ready to support any breached defense line at any time.

Fourth, disrupt the navigation capability of the Shatt al-Arab. This measure requires coordinating the engineering units of the Iran Revolutionary Guard to lay mines and obstacles at key nodes of the waterway so that Iraq's mechanized forces cannot use the waterway to advance rapidly.

The core philosophy of this plan, Reza did not explicitly state, but everyone present could hear it—it was not to "repel" the Iraq offensive, but to "annihilate" Iraq's main offensive force.

Once Saddam's tank clusters suffered devastating blows at the border, Iraq's offensive momentum would be completely destroyed, and then Iran could switch to a counter-offensive, pushing the battlefield into Iraq territory.

This was the script Reza had been preparing all along.