74: Chapter 71 The Gunshot

November 4, 1979, Tehran.

At 2:00 AM, the guard post outside the US Embassy received the first wave of student protesters.

When Reza received the news in his office in Ahvaz, it was already that afternoon. Karimi's intelligence network had conveyed the chaos at the scene faster than any other channel in Iran—it wasn't an organized demonstration, but a direct occupation. Thousands of students had stormed into the embassy courtyard, torn down the embassy flags, and taken control of the entire building.

Hassan saw Reza's reaction after hanging up the phone and asked, "Is this the sound of gunfire you were waiting for?"

"It is the beginning, not the end," Reza said. "The trouble is only just starting now."

He showed no panic, simply walking over to the map, staring at the map of Iran for about a minute, and then turning to say to Hassan:

"Call Farrokhzad here, tonight. Also, notify Salahati; put all oil fields on high alert. If any armed personnel enter Khuzestan, I want to know immediately."

"What do you expect the US to do?"

"Send troops," Reza said. "Maybe within two weeks, maybe three, but they will certainly come. And not just the US; other powers might try to intervene as well. I need the army to be prepared in advance, rather than being caught in a passive state during the chaos."

That evening, Farrokhzad arrived.

His expression was tighter than it had been when they last met, his whole demeanor reflecting a state of "prepared but uncertain." As soon as he sat down, he got straight to the point:

"The occupation of the embassy has thrown the entire military into disarray—some say we should immediately send in troops to clear the area, some say we should let the students end it themselves, and some are even saying this was tacitly approved by Ayatollah Khomeini."

"What does Ayatollah Khomeini say?"

"He didn't say anything at first, but now he has issued a statement saying he 'does not oppose it'," Farrokhzad said. "This is equivalent to tacit approval. But if the US really decides to send troops or dispatch aircraft carriers, Ayatollah Khomeini's current influence in the military is enough to make them obey without needing to rely on the military's own judgment."

"That is exactly what I need you to do," Reza said. "The embassy crisis will draw everyone's attention to Tehran. During this window of opportunity, I need you to unite those within the military who are inclined toward professionalism and oppose direct political involvement, forming a sufficiently independent force that can say 'no' at any moment."

"What is the price of doing this?" Farrokhzad asked.

"In the worst-case scenario, you will be considered a factionalist," Reza said. "But if my judgment is correct, the Iran-Iraq War will break out in less than a year. When that time comes, a military force with independent will and professional judgment will be worth more than any faction."

Farrokhzad was silent for a few seconds, then said something that made Reza feel this man had fully understood what he was doing:

"You are shaping an army capable of resisting any political pressure."

"Not just resisting, but maintaining its own professionalism," Reza said. "An army completely controlled by politics will eventually become an army without combat effectiveness. I need a force that is both loyal to the nation and not hijacked by any faction."

"I understand," Farrokhzad said, standing up. "I will begin moving tomorrow."

He walked to the door, paused, and turned back to ask a question: "Before that, can you tell me what your ultimate goal is? I need to know what I am striving for."

Reza did not hesitate and said directly:

"To make Iran a country that truly belongs to the Iranians—not to the US, not to the Soviet Union, not a tool for any sect, but belonging only to the people on this land. To achieve this, we need an army that has both professional capability and a moral bottom line."

Farrokhzad nodded after listening and left.

Over the next three weeks, the development of the embassy crisis proceeded exactly as Reza had predicted—Ayatollah Khomeini called the students' occupation of the embassy the "Second Revolution" in a nationwide televised address, calling on people across the country to support the students' actions; US President Carter initially tried to resolve it through diplomatic channels, but eventually announced the freezing of Iranian assets and the implementation of economic sanctions against Iran; the UN Security Council demanded the release of the hostages, but was vetoed by the Soviet Union.

Throughout this process, Reza did two things that seemed unrelated.

First, through Karimi's channels, he copied a key document from the US Embassy—a complete intelligence report on US oil policy toward Iran—and passed it to the Soviet KGB through a secret contact in Moscow. The content of this document confirmed Iran's long-standing accusations regarding US plundering of oil, placing international public opinion squarely on Iran's side, while also allowing the Soviet Union to obtain a complete map of the US intelligence network in Iran. It was a worthwhile trade—Reza used the US's missteps to gain the Soviet Union's promise of support for Iran.

Second, on the tenth day of the embassy crisis, in the name of "protecting Iran's most important economic resources," he mobilized the armed militias in Khuzestan and set up defensive positions around the three major oil fields in Abadan, Kharg Island, and Khorramabad. Nominally, this was to prevent "US special forces from infiltrating and sabotaging," but in reality, it was to demonstrate to the central government the actual military control capability that Khuzestan possessed.

Together, these two things achieved three goals: first, obtaining strategic support from the Soviet Union; second, making it impossible for the Iranian interim government to effectively restrict the actions in Khuzestan; and third, establishing an autonomous defense system in advance for the upcoming Iran-Iraq War.

On November 22, Reza had his second meeting with Ayatollah Khomeini in Tehran.

This meeting did not take place at the Motahari Mosque, but at a more secure mansion Ayatollah Khomeini had recently moved into, located further away from the city center. The timing of the meeting was kept secret; only Karimi and two bodyguards knew that Reza had entered the city.

Ayatollah Khomeini looked even more exhausted than the last time; the hostage crisis had kept him from getting any real rest for a whole month, but his gaze still retained that deep, penetrating quality.

As soon as Reza entered the room, he said: "Ayatollah, the Americans are preparing to use force. I need to know, when this happens, what you need."

Ayatollah Khomeini did not answer immediately; he simply pointed to the chair opposite him, signaling for Reza to sit down, and then asked a rhetorical question:

"Your Highness, have you come to tell me the Americans will use force, or to ask me what I need?"

"Both," Reza said. "But if I must choose one, I am here to inform you."

"Then speak," Ayatollah Khomeini said. "Tell me your assessment."

Reza did not hold back at all, stating his complete analysis of the situation—the US would not send troops directly because that would mean a full-scale ground war, and the Carter administration could not afford such a cost; the most likely action by the US would be to send carrier battle groups into the Persian Gulf and then create one or two "incidents" in Iran's coastal areas, attempting to provoke Iran into making some kind of radical move, thereby finding an excuse for further US military intervention.

"And my position is," Reza said, "that Khuzestan is ready for this. If the US truly dares to do this, I can ensure that their first ship to enter the Persian Gulf will pay the price."

After hearing this, Ayatollah Khomeini was silent for a long time, then asked a short question:

"Can you do it?"

"I can," Reza said. "But the cost is high."

"What kind of cost?"

"The fact that Khuzestan already possesses a military force of considerable scale will be exposed," Reza said. "And this fact will make any power that wants to treat Iran as a country that can be manipulated at will feel vigilant—including you."

The "including you" at the end of that sentence was Reza very carefully drawing a bottom line—I can bear a huge cost for Iran's interests, but I will not let anyone, even Ayatollah Khomeini, treat my strength as a free tool.

Something flashed in Ayatollah Khomeini's eyes at that moment—not anger, not questioning, but something closer to "appreciation."

"Very well," Ayatollah Khomeini finally said. "My meaning is, when that day comes, do what you believe is right. What Iran needs is a force that can protect itself without being enslaved by the promises of any power."

Reza stood up, performed a salute, and turned to leave.

As he walked out the door, Ayatollah Khomeini's voice came from behind—not loud, but clear enough for one to hear:

"Your Highness, I now somewhat understand why the Pahlavi Dynasty feared not the revolution itself, but people like you rising from the ruins of the revolution."