15: Chapter 15 Nuclear Weapons

In his past life, Chen Feng knew that nuclear weapons were the ultimate trump card for Iran to establish a firm foothold in the Middle East.

But this card could not be played too early—playing it too soon would only give Israel and the United States a reason to join forces and destroy Iran.

The correct sequence was: first establish conventional military strength—missiles, tanks, anti-aircraft systems—and then quietly develop nuclear technology under the protective umbrella of that conventional military strength.

Fatima's centrifuges were the seeds of Iran's nuclear program for the next decade.

But seeds need to wait for spring.

And right now, it was still winter.

Besides the military industry, Reza had done another thing in the past year and a half—something even more important than building missiles.

He began building a political network.

The entry point was the mosques.

In 1970s Iran, mosques were not just religious venues; they were the "information hubs" of the grassroots society.

The Pahlavi Government could control newspapers, radio stations, and universities, but it could not control what the mullahs in the mosques said during Friday prayers.

Ayatollah Khomeini had built influence throughout Iran by distributing cassette tapes through the mosque network.

Reza did not intend to compete with Ayatollah Khomeini for religious discourse—he was not a cleric and possessed no religious authority.

But he could make deals with the mosque system.

The bargaining chips were simple: money and food.

After the irrigation system in Khuzestan Province was successful, Reza replicated this model in Lorestan Province and Ilam Province—both were impoverished western provinces that the central government had long ignored.

He used Abdullah Al-Sabah's smuggling network to procure building materials and PVC pipes, hired local workers, and built irrigation canals and small water reservoirs in the name of "charitable donations."

The implementation of every project was facilitated by local mosques.

The mullahs were very happy to cooperate—because these projects greatly increased their prestige among the congregation.

"It is the money donated by His Highness Reza, distributed through our mosque." This sentence made the mullahs both grateful to Reza and helped them save face before the congregation.

By the spring of 1977, Reza had established connections in four provinces in western Iran through the mosque network.

Each province had three to five "core mosques"—where the mullahs had direct contact with Reza and were willing to relay his messages and mobilize people at critical moments.

These mullahs were not Reza's "subordinates"—they were a community of shared interests.

Reza gave them money and resources, and they gave Reza a grassroots base and information channels.

Neither side needed to pretend loyalty; binding interests were enough.

But having only the western provinces was not enough.

The political center of Iran was in Tehran, Isfahan, and Tabriz.

These three cities were the engines of the revolution—the large-scale demonstrations of 1978 started from these three cities and spread to the whole country.

Reza needed to plant a "node" in each of these three cities.

Not spies. Agents.

People who could speak for him, organize for him, and step forward for him at critical moments.

He already had a candidate for Tehran—Fatima's mentor, Professor Mortazavi of the Physics Department at the University of Tehran.

A secular intellectual who opposed Pahlavi's "White Revolution" but also did not trust Ayatollah Khomeini's religious fanaticism.

He represented the "third voice" of Iranian society—neither pro-American nor pro-religious, just wanting an independent, modern country that belonged to the Iranians themselves.

Such people were very influential in intellectual circles.

But they lacked organizational ability and funding, and had always been a group of people with "ideas but no action."

Reza wanted to give them the ability to act.

He contacted Professor Mortazavi through Fatima and, as an "anonymous donor," funded an underground publication launched by the professor—Voice of Persia.

The content of the publication was very moderate: discussing Iran's economic problems, criticizing government corruption, and calling for national autonomy.

It did not involve religion or the royal family—SAVAK's focus for censorship was on the "left wing" and "religious extremism," so they couldn't be bothered with this kind of "moderate nationalist" publication.

But on the last page of every issue, there was a line of small print—"The interests of Persia are above all else."

This was the code. It was also the brand.

When the revolution broke out in 1978, everyone who had read Voice of Persia would know—the person who said this was someone on their side.

And the person who would stand up and say this line when the time came would be Reza himself.

Agents for Isfahan and Tabriz were still being sought.

Time was running out.

The history of his past life told him—at the end of 1977, US President Carter would begin to pressure King Pahlavi under the banner of "human rights diplomacy," demanding that he relax the suppression of the opposition.

This change in foreign policy would directly lead to a decline in SAVAK's control, opening a window for all opposition factions—including Ayatollah Khomeini's people.

The window of opportunity was only about one year.

Before things went completely out of control in 1978, Reza had to put all his pieces in place.

Military, industrial, political, intelligence—four lines advancing simultaneously.

Every line was a tightrope walk.

One wrong step could lead to total destruction.

But Reza had no way back.

He stood at the entrance of the Cyrus Workshop, with the desert night sky above him and the most secret underground arsenal in the entire Middle East beneath his feet.

On the distant desert horizon, a crescent moon hung in the sky.

Persians call the crescent moon "hilal"—which also means "beginning."