91: Chapter 88 Bloodfire Pump Station

October 14, 1980, 4:00 AM, Zubair Oilfield Pump Station.

The supply convoy arrived at 2:00 AM, three hours earlier than expected. One thousand Anti-tank mines, five hundred RPGs, six sets of portable anti-aircraft missiles, and one hundred and twenty reinforcement soldiers—not three thousand, just one hundred and twenty.

Rafsanjani explained the reason in the telegram: "Tehran has differing opinions on 'fighting beyond the national borders.' Bani-Sadr believes that our primary mission is to defend Iran territory and that we should not commit excessive forces within Iraq."

Reza read the telegram and said nothing.

He had long expected this.

Bani-Sadr would not miss any opportunity to weaken him.

Fighting within Iran was one thing, but fighting inside Iraq was another—the latter gave the opposition in Tehran a moral excuse: "We are defending our motherland, not helping Reza expand his territory."

"Your Highness," Hassan walked up to him, "there are only one hundred and twenty men. The original defense plan needs to be adjusted."

"No adjustment is needed," Reza said, "the original plan was based on a strength of two thousand. Now we have two thousand one hundred and twenty men, one hundred and twenty more."

"But the three thousand men Rafsanjani mentioned—"

"They won't be coming," Reza interrupted him, "at least not today. So we have to use the two thousand one hundred and twenty men we have to hold back Iraq's thirty thousand."

When he said this, his tone was as calm as if he were discussing what to have for breakfast.

"How do we hold them back?" Hassan asked.

"Anti-tank mines," Reza said, "one thousand Anti-tank mines, all buried along the routes the Iraqis are likely to attack from today. Not in a line, but in a field—three per square meter, with a density so high that mine-clearing vehicles won't be able to clear them."

"How much time will that take?"

"Six hours. From now until 10:00 AM, all your men will go lay mines. Rajai's men will be responsible for security and cover."

Hassan nodded and turned to make the deployments.

At 5:00 AM, before dawn, Hassan's mine-laying team set out.

One thousand Anti-tank mines were distributed among two hundred men, five for each.

They had to bury these one thousand mines in the complex desert terrain, in the dark, along every route the Iraq tanks might take.

Reza personally designed the mine-laying plan—not a uniform distribution, but concentrated in three key areas: the open ground two kilometers north of the Pump Station, the dry riverbed three kilometers west of the Pump Station, and a seasonal creek to the southwest of the Pump Station.

These three areas were the most likely attack routes for the Iraq armored forces.

Reza had studied the tactical preferences of the Iraqis during their previous two attacks and discovered a trait of their commanders—they liked to take the "seemingly easy" paths.

Open ground, dry riverbeds, and creeks were all terrain that tanks could easily traverse.

And what Reza wanted to do was turn these "easy paths" into "impassable roads."

At 8:00 AM, the reconnaissance aircraft reported: Iraq forces had already begun moving toward the Pump Station.

The vanguard was an armored reconnaissance battalion, about twenty tanks and armored vehicles, advancing along the road toward the Pump Station.

"Notify Hassan to abandon the unfinished mine-laying task and have all personnel withdraw to their positions," Reza said, "let the Iraq scouts come in."

"Let them in?" Rajai asked, puzzled.

"Yes, let them in, then let them go back."

The logic behind this tactic was: if the Iraq scouts encountered strong resistance when approaching the Pump Station, they would report "solid defenses ahead"; but if they encountered nothing, reached the perimeter of the Pump Station smoothly, and were then driven back by an Iran ambush, they would report "an ambush ahead"—and "an ambush" would make a commander hesitate more than "defenses," because an ambush implies unpredictability.

At 8:30 AM, the Iraq reconnaissance battalion entered the area two kilometers north of the Pump Station.

They encountered no resistance.

The commander of the reconnaissance battalion ordered the troops to continue advancing until they were less than one kilometer from the Pump Station.

Then Hassan made his move.

Not with RPGs, but with mortars.

Three mortar shells landed in front of and behind the reconnaissance battalion's convoy. They didn't hit any vehicles directly, but they precisely sealed off their routes of advance and retreat.

The Iraq reconnaissance battalion commander immediately ordered a retreat.

His judgment was correct—when ambushed in a position with unknown enemy intelligence, the best option was to retreat and reorganize.

But what he didn't know was that Hassan's mortars only had these three shells.

The entire "ambush" was just a ruse—using three shells to create the illusion that "there is powerful firepower here."

At 9:00 AM, the Iraq reconnaissance battalion withdrew to their starting position and reported to their superiors: "There is an Iran ambush force in the area north of the Pump Station, of unknown size, with at least one mortar company."

"One mortar company," this was the reconnaissance battalion commander's estimate.

The mortar fire he heard came from three different directions, so he judged there was at least a company's worth of mortars.

In reality, Hassan only had three mortars, each having fired only one shell.

At 10:00 AM, the Iraq commander received the reconnaissance report.

He fell into new hesitation—if Iran had deployed a mortar company north of the Pump Station, it meant their defensive strength was stronger than anticipated.

He decided to change the direction of the attack.

Turning from the road to the dry riverbed.

And the dry riverbed was precisely the second minefield Reza had pre-set.

At 11:00 AM, the Iraq vanguard entered the dry riverbed.

Forty T-62 tanks, arranged in two columns, advanced along the dried-up riverbed.

The ground of the riverbed was hard, the tanks moved smoothly, and the riverbanks on both sides provided natural cover—the Iraq commander's choice of this route was tactically reasonable.

But the width of the riverbed was limited; the two tank columns almost occupied the entire width of the riverbed.

This meant that once they entered the minefield, they could not disperse, could not bypass, and had no choice but to bite the bullet and charge forward.

At 11:17 AM, the first mine exploded.

Then came the second, third, and fourth—not sequentially, but almost simultaneously, because Hassan's mine-laying team had buried the mines very densely, and every tank had a high probability of running over at least one mine.

In less than thirty seconds, more than twenty explosions rang out in the riverbed.

Out of the forty tanks, at least fifteen had their tracks blown off and were paralyzed in the riverbed.

The tanks following behind were blocked; they could neither advance nor retreat—because the riverbed was too narrow, and the paralyzed tanks lay across the middle of the road, blocking the entire passage completely.

The Iraq commander roared in the communication channel: "Mine-clearing vehicles! Send me mine-clearing vehicles!"

But the mine-clearing vehicles were at the very back of the convoy and were blocked.

At 11:30 AM, Reza gave his second order: "Anti-tank teams, attack."

Twenty anti-tank teams, three men per team, poked their heads out from the riverbanks on both sides of the riverbed and aimed their RPGs at the paralyzed Iraq tanks.

At this distance, the hit rate of the RPGs exceeded ninety percent.

Tank after tank was hit, caught fire, and exploded.

Iraq tank crews tried to crawl out of the hatches, but many were engulfed by the burning ammunition compartments before they could climb out.

The battle lasted less than twenty minutes.

Of the forty T-62s, twenty-three were completely destroyed, eleven were abandoned by their crews after losing combat capability, and only six successfully reversed out of the riverbed.

Iraq casualties and missing exceeded one hundred and fifty, with over sixty captured.

On the Iran side, two were killed in action, and nine were wounded.

The exchange ratio was still lopsided.