211: Chapter 211 released a sanctions list.

After all, more and more weapons and equipment were appearing in countries in the Persian Gulf region, and Syria, in particular, had even used this equipment to make the USA military suffer. If the sources of these weapons were ignored, the USA would eventually be affected.

The USA had attempted to dismantle and study these air defense missiles, armored vehicles, and other equipment, but all attempts had failed. Not only did this cause certain losses, but they also failed to understand the performance of this equipment; they only knew that while some equipment could not compare to the USA's active-duty weapons, there were quite a few that could rival or even surpass them.

If countries in the Persian Gulf region were allowed to acquire more and more of this equipment, it would lead to a decrease in USA arms sales and increase the risks for USA troops stationed in the Persian Gulf.

Only by completely cutting off the supply channels for the weapons and equipment purchased by countries in the Persian Gulf region could the USA feel at ease. Even regarding arms-producing nations like Russia and China, the USA could exert pressure to reduce their arms export volumes, or at worst, impose sanctions to make these direct arms exporters wary.

After all, arms exporters needed to use the banking system controlled by the USA for settlements and required certain components provided by the USA and its allies. In the end, they could always find an excuse for sanctions, dealing a fatal blow to these arms exporters.

As long as these arms exporters saw that the potential losses of other interests were greater than the losses from exporting arms to countries in the Persian Gulf region, they would obediently reduce their exports to those countries. This would be very beneficial for Israel's military operations.

The Intelligence Investigation Bureau had already conducted relevant intelligence gathering and mastered some transaction details. Coupled with information provided by insiders in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and other countries, the Intelligence Investigation Bureau quickly obtained more information.

These weapons and equipment had the lineage of Chinese weapons, but they were not entirely the same. Many of the weapons and equipment were not used by the Chinese military at all and had never been seen in Chinese military exercises. Even after verifying with some personnel from the Chinese military who sold intelligence, they could not find the manufacturers of this equipment.

This frustrated the Intelligence Investigation Bureau. Even if the intelligence provided by insiders stated that the people conducting the transactions were indeed from China, they at least needed to know which arms manufacturer was producing them. However, after much effort, and even using their deepest undercover agents, they still could not find the specific manufacturer.

Without finding the manufacturer, the two companies currently selling the weapons and equipment were at most third-party companies, so sanctions would have no effect. After all, it was easy to switch selling companies, but the manufacturing factory was the main target for sanctions.

Looking at the completed investigation report, the Intelligence Investigation Bureau could only tally the types and approximate quantities of new weapons and equipment possessed by countries in the Persian Gulf region. They had specific performance data, but it was not particularly comprehensive. Regarding arms suppliers, they could only identify Chaos Company and Green Lotus Company, with accounts at Swiss Bank and Hengfeng Bank.

Chaos Company was used most frequently for signing arms contracts, while Green Lotus Company was used very rarely. For the time being, no other companies were found to be involved in the arms trade. Looking at the flow of funds for the arms trade, most were paid using energy and mineral resources, with only a small portion paid via bank accounts.

The Intelligence Investigation Bureau had not tracked the final destination of these energy and mineral resource payments. They could not determine which ports they were shipped from, which companies they were sold to, nor had they detected any abnormal increases in large-scale energy and mineral imports at Chinese ports.

The Intelligence Investigation Bureau itself felt that such an investigation report was somewhat perfunctory. However, without more intelligence support, there was no way to uncover more information to deal a fatal blow to the arms exporters.

Helpless, the Intelligence Investigation Bureau had to submit this investigation report to the United States Department of Defense. Upon seeing it, the United States Department of Defense found it unbelievable; wasn't the Intelligence Investigation Bureau supposed to be the most powerful intelligence agency in the world? How could they provide such an investigation report with so little practical value?

The Department of Defense was very angry at the Intelligence Investigation Bureau's perfunctoriness and immediately questioned them, demanding more intelligence content. However, after some communication, the United States Department of Defense had to accept this investigation report.

Although the Intelligence Investigation Bureau could monitor the globe, even after monitoring arms manufacturers in major arms-producing nations, they had not found any abnormal production orders that could possibly satisfy the arms procurement needs of the countries in the Persian Gulf region.

The United States Department of Defense had no choice but to adopt this investigation report and decided to impose sanctions on Chaos Company, Green Lotus Company, and Li Yi himself, requiring countries around the world to strictly prohibit arms transactions with them and demanding that all banking and financial institutions not provide them with financial services.

At the same time, the USA froze the accounts of Chaos Company and Green Lotus Company at Swiss Bank and Hengfeng Bank. Seeing the freezing notice from the USA, Swiss Bank and Hengfeng Bank did not resist at all and directly agreed.

However, what the United States Department of Defense did not expect was that the bank accounts of Chaos Company and Green Lotus Company had almost no funds. The existing funds were merely what remained from interest settlements, totaling only a few thousand dollars, which did not match the financial scale of an arms dealer selling large quantities of weapons and equipment to countries in the Persian Gulf region.

Where did the money go? The Intelligence Investigation Bureau immediately intervened, demanding that Swiss Bank and Hengfeng Bank provide detailed transaction statements. They soon obtained the bank statements and found a list of recipients, including Mannila, Lieutenant Colonel Haidari, and others.

But after checking the bank accounts of Mannila, Lieutenant Colonel Haidari, and others, they similarly found that the account balances were basically zero, and the funds had long since disappeared. In desperation, the United States Department of Defense simply added Mannila, Lieutenant Colonel Haidari, and others to the sanctions list, monitoring the use of their bank accounts in hopes of finding some clues.

Soon, the United States Department of Defense released a sanctions list, announcing sanctions against individuals and companies such as Li Yi, Mannila, Lieutenant Colonel Haidari, Chaos Company, and Green Lotus Company, on the grounds of illegally selling weapons to terrorist organizations and endangering world peace.

Initially, the United States Department of Defense saw that the list of sanctioned members was too small and wanted to include other Chinese arms companies on the list, but to prevent China from retaliating and actually expanding arms sales, they ultimately did not add to the list.